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ABSTRACT
The vision of the Smart Grid includes the creation of intelligent
electricity supply networks to allow efﬁcient use of energy resour-
ces, reduce carbon emissions and are robust to failures. One of the
key assumptions underlying this vision is that it will be possible to
manage the trading of electricity between homes and micro-grids
while coping with the inherent real-time dynamism in electricity
demand and supply. The management of these trades needs to take
into account the fact that most, if not all, of the actors in the system
are self-interested and transmission line capacities are constrained.
Against this background, we develop and evaluate a novel market-
based mechanism and novel trading strategies for the Smart Grid.
Our mechanism is based on the Continuous Double Auction (CDA)
and automatically manages the congestion within the system by
pricing the ﬂow of electricity. We also introduce mechanisms to
ensure the system can cope with unforseen demand or increased
supply capacity in real time. Finally, we develop new strategies
that we show achieve high market efﬁciency (typically over 90%).
1. INTRODUCTION
The creation of the “Smart Grid” is widely recognised as one of
the most important challenges faced by developed countries this
century [8]. The vision includes, but is not limited to, the creation
of intelligent electricity supply networks that use energy resources
efﬁciently, reduce carbon emissions and increase robustness to fail-
ures[8, 9, 15]. IntheUKspeciﬁcally, the2008ClimateChangeAct
mandates a 32% reduction of carbon emissions by 2020 and 80%
by 2050. To this end, in recent years, new technologies such as
smart meters and micro-grids (where electricity is generated and
used within a local network which may or may not be part of the
larger grid) have been developed. These technologies, coupled with
energy storage technology and embedded green energy generators
(e.g., biomass, wind power, and solar), will support a complete de-
centralisation of the supply and management of electricity that will
be more efﬁcient and reduce reliance on fossil fuels.
One of the key assumptions underlying this vision of the Smart
Grid is that it will be possible to manage the trading of electric-
ity between homes and micro-grids, while coping with the inherent
real-time dynamism in electricity demand and supply. Moreover,
the management of these trades needs to take into account the fact
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that the actors in the system are self-interested. This means, they
may misrepresent their preferences (e.g., amount of electricity re-
quired, the capacity they can supply and prices they would accept)
in order to maximise their proﬁt. Within current electricity mar-
kets, such attempts to “game” the system are often mitigated by
strict regulation and audits. However, this approach would be im-
practical if every household is a potential supplier and/or consumer.
In such systems it is also critical that trades take into account the
limited capacity of transmission lines. When these lines are over-
loaded, they may break down and cause, in the best case, dam-
age to the system and a minor blackout or, in the worst case, a
massive blackout.
1 These signiﬁcant challenges call for the need
to build decentralised autonomous systems that are self-organising
and achieve high levels of efﬁciency. In this context, the multi-
agent systems paradigm has been advocated as one of the main ap-
proaches to building such systems. In particular, market-based ap-
proaches have been particularly successful at achieving high levels
of efﬁciency when having to deal with large decentralised systems
composed of self-interested agents [5]. These market mechanisms
are particularly useful when agents prefer to keep their preferences
private (as opposed to revealing them to a trusted centre that opti-
mises the state of the entire system) and only have a local view of
theenvironment. Whilebuildinglargescalesystemsinthiswayhas
been particularly successful (e.g., stock markets, Internet auctions),
so far, applications to the electricity grid have been limited.
Against this background, in this paper we develop and evalu-
ate a novel market-based mechanism and novel agent-based trad-
ing strategies for the Smart Grid. Our mechanism naturally man-
ages the self-interested actions of the participants, while guarantee-
ing a high level of surplus and ensuring that transmission lines are
never overloaded. In more detail, we consider that each node in
the electricity network can contain buyers or sellers (e.g., individ-
uals, whole neighbourhoods, or generators) that aim to buy or sell
electricity on a day-ahead basis (most markets are run a day ahead
as large generators have physical limits on how quickly they can
change their supply rate). Our approach differs from mechanisms
that currently exist in the wholesale electricity market in that we
do not assume that buyers and sellers, which we term agents, will
truthfully reveal their reserve prices and consumption/generation
pattern. Speciﬁcally, our mechanism is based on the Continuous
Double Auction (CDA) which allows agents to make offers contin-
uously in the market and improve upon these until a transaction is
possible (i.e. a match between a buyer and a seller is found). While
the CDA has been shown to be very efﬁcient (in surplus maximi-
sation) for the trading of goods or services (e.g., in the Nasdaq and
1The largest power outage in history, in the Northeast US in 2003,
resulted in the total loss of electrical power to 55M people and was
attributed to the failure of a single overhead power line that sagged
due to excessive thermal heating and touched nearby vegetation.NYSE stock market), little is known as to what its performance
would be in electricity markets which are signiﬁcantly different
from traditional applications. First, in contrast to typical goods that
go directly from seller to buyer, electricity ﬂows along the paths of
least resistance to any node in the network. Hence, when trans-
mission lines are congested, it is important that more proﬁtable
transactions are prioritised. Given this, we implement a conges-
tion pricing scheme for electricity ﬂow in transmission lines. Sec-
ond, if agents use more electricity than they bought one day-ahead
(since the ﬂow of electricity cannot be controlled), generators in the
system have to cope with the real-time demand in order to guaran-
tee that the system stays balanced (i.e. supply meets demand). To
this end, we design novel balancing mechanisms that ensure buy-
ers pay a fair price for their unexpected demand and generators are
also fairly compensated for accommodating such sudden increases
in demand. In so doing, the market guarantees the best deal for
all agents even if they fail to predict accurately their demands and
supply. Moreover, we show that agents cannot game the balancing
mechanism, as doing otherwise, they are guaranteed to make a loss.
In more detail, this paper advances the state of the art as follows:
1. We provide a new electricity market mechanism for self-
interestedagents. Ourmechanismmanagescongestionwithin
the system by pricing the ﬂow of electricity computed by DC
ﬂow approximation.
2. We introduce a novel a balancing scheme that ensures the
system can cope with unforseen demand or increased supply
capacity. Using our scheme, unmatched offers in the day-
ahead market are used to respond to changes in supply and
demand at the most competitive prices. More importantly,
such prices are generated in real-time and ensure agents bid
truthfully in the market.
3. We provide a method for evolving transmission line conges-
tion prices over time to increase the efﬁciency of our pro-
posed electricity market. This method allows our market
mechanism to achieve close to optimal allocations.
4. We provide new measures, which we term Dynamic Loca-
tional Marginal Prices (DLMPs) that indicate levels of en-
demic congestion in areas of the network and can be used as
a guide for future infrastructure improvements.
When taken together, this is the ﬁrst attempt to create a scalable
and efﬁcient electricity market that ensures security of supply (i.e.,
is resilient to failures and dynamic demand and supply).
The rest of this paper is organised as follows. Section 2 con-
tains a review of the related work. In Section 3 we describe mathe-
matical models that motivate our proposed electricity market. The
market mechanism is explained in detail in Section 4 and Section 5
describes our trading agents. Section 6 evaluates our market mech-
anism and agents empirically and Section 7 concludes.
2. RELATED WORK
Research in Smart Grid technologies has leapt forward in recent
years (see [8, 9] for overviews). Furthermore, agent based auc-
tion simulations have been used to model existing electricity net-
works [1, 4] and the macro-economics literature has examined their
design [17, 11]. However, there has been little research into de-
signing market rules for the Smart Grid where capacity constraints
and automated network management (i.e., ensuring secure trans-
mission) become serious issues due to the complexity of managing
the increased number of market participants [6].
In more detail, the leading attempt to create an intelligent agent
basedmarketsystemundercapacityconstraintsistheAMESWhole-
sale Power Market Test Bed [14]. Their work is based on the con-
cept of Locational Marginal Pricing whereby generators in the sys-
tem are paid according to location in the network and given the
transmission line capacity constraints. AMES models an electric-
ity market and computes Locational Marginal Prices (LMPs) for
allocations computed a day ahead of the actual consumption for
48 half-hour settlement periods. In their model, bids are linear
price sensitive demand and supply preference curves, combined
with ﬁxed, price insensitive demands. Their model closely ap-
proximates recently introduced electricity markets in the US (New
Hampshire) and New Zealand. However, as they acknowledge,
the impact of the agents (particularly generators) misreporting their
preference curves can signiﬁcantly reduce the efﬁciency of the sys-
tem. In this paper we do not make any such assumptions, however
we do use the AMES method to compute the optimal allocation
against which we compute the efﬁciency of our experimental re-
sults [18].
Our work is also related to most research on Continuous Double
Auctions with automated bidding agents. Previous studies on such
systems have found them to be highly efﬁcient — often averaging
at only a few percent away from optimality. This is true even for
“zero-intelligence” (ZI) agents that only bid randomly above their
limit price [10], as well as for agents that have much more intel-
ligent strategies [3]. In this case, the two bidding strategies we
use are ZI [10] which is the known baseline (since they have the
simplest behaviour) and AA [19], the best performing algorithm
(shown to reach efﬁciencies of 99.9% in static environments) in
the literature respectively. Finally, our work also relates to other
congestion control schemes, in particular Dual algorithms for com-
puter networks [12]. However, these algorithms are not directly
applicable as they assume simple node responses, whereas our pro-
posed mechanism runs a more complex CDA. Moreover, ﬂow in
electricity networks is governed by physical laws as opposed to
network routing mechanisms.
3. BACKGROUND
We consider a system where there are a set of agents that can be
both buyers b 2 B and sellers s 2 S. The electricity network is a
graph composed of nodes n
1;n
2; 2 N and transmission lines
t 2 T and is noted as G = (N;T). A given node n is a point at
which agents reside and can either generate or consume electricity
that induce ﬂows on the lines connected to it. A transmission line
is a pair of nodes t = (n;n
0) where n;n
0 2 N. Now, each buyer
or seller is located on one of the nodes (e.g., individual houses, or
a generator) and there may be multiple buyers and sellers at each
node (e.g., neighbourhoods, multiple wind turbines). We denote as
nb and ns the nodes where a buyer b resides and seller s resides
respectively. Alternatively, we specify as Bn = fbjnb 2 Ng as the
set of buyers at node n and Sn = fsjns 2 Ng as the set of sellers
at node n. We also, denote the transmission lines connected to a
given node n as Tn = ftjt = (n;n
0) 2 Tg.
3.1 Properties of Buyers and Sellers
Each buyer has a ﬁxed demand for electricity q
fixed
b 2 R
+ (i.e., for
which it is ready to pay any price). Each buyer also has a marginal
cost function that dictates how much it is willing to pay for a given
quantity qb 2 [0;q
max
b ] beyond their ﬁxed demand, where q
max
b +
q
fixed
b is the maximum amount of electricity it needs. Similarly,
each seller’s cost function says how much the seller is willing to
sell a quantity qs 2 [0;q
max
s ] for where q
max
s is the maximum
amount of electricity it can generate. We consider typical marginal
cost functions (see [13]) for buyers and sellers as follows:
 Buyer b has cost function pb = cb   dbqb, where constantscb;db 2 R
+ and db is usually very small compared to cb. In
particular, db represents b’s price sensitivity to increasing the
quantity it is buying.
 Seller s has cost function ps = xs + ysqs, where constants
xs;ys 2 R
+. In particular, ys represents the seller’s increas-
ing costs with increasing production.
When buyers and sellers at different nodes trade electricity, they
generate power ﬂows in the transmission lines throughout the net-
workwheretheamountofﬂowineachlineisdeterminedaccording
to the properties of the line and the voltage generated at each node
in the network. We discuss these properties in more detail next.
3.2 Properties of Transmission Lines
Electricity generators in the network will typically generate an al-
ternating current (AC) [14]. However, for tractability, we compute
the AC power ﬂow using the DC ﬂow approximation, as is common
in the study of power networks [18]. In the DC ﬂow approximation,
each transmission line carries power according to the properties of
the line and voltage angles (created by an alternating voltage) ap-
plied at its ends.
2 In more detail, a transmission line has a reac-
tance rt 2 R
+ which dictates how much power will ﬂow through
it given the angle difference at its end points. If n;n0 2 R
+
are voltage angles (in radians) at the different ends of a transmis-
sion line t = (n;n
0), then the power ﬂow in the line is given by
qt = (n   n0)=rt.
Now, in traditional electricity networks, transmission lines are
owned by heavily regulated operators that charge a ﬁxed fee to the
users to connect to the network. In this paper, we look at the novel
approach of having transmission line owners charge users accord-
ing to the amount of electricity they transport for them. This is
preferable to a ﬂat connection fee as it prices low proﬁt transactions
out of the market, thus, prioritising more proﬁtable transactions
when resources are limited and increasing the overall market efﬁ-
ciency. However, it has never been possible because electricity net-
works typically date back more than 50 years and are not equipped
with appropriate information networking capabilities. However, in
the future the Smart Grid will be network-enabled which, in turn,
will allow transmission lines to detect the effect of each node’s in-
put/output in the system and hence charge each user for its usage of
the line. The system presented in Section 4.2 gives an idea of how
these ﬂows might be computed. We assume that all lines are owned
ormaintainedbyanetworkmanager thatappliessomeformofcon-
gestion pricing to the network [12]. The network manager endows
each transmission line with price function pt = wt + zttjqtj
t,
where wt;zt;(t   1) 2 R
+ are constants deﬁned per line and
qt 2 [ q
max
t ;q
max
t ] where qmax represents the maximum that the
line can carry. Lines capacity is limited due to the physical proper-
ties of copper wires in them, they heat up with increasing ﬂow and
may sag excessively if overheated. Hence, we assume transmis-
sion lines charge pt = 1 for jqtj  q
max
t . Note, since electricity
can ﬂow in any direction along a line, it is beneﬁcial for transmis-
sion lines to pay agents that create counter ﬂows (i.e., demand and
supply at its endpoints that reverse the ﬂow of electricity to some
degree) across them since this reduces the total ﬂow.
Having described the properties of all the actors in the system,
we next describe how, traditionally, the efﬁcient allocation is com-
puted in a day-ahead electricity market and how the market copes
2This relies on the assumptions that resistances in transmission
lines are small and voltage magnitudes stay close to some ﬁxed
value. These assumptions are not unreasonable, with typical net
power loss due to electrical resistance over the UK transmission
network at less than 3% [11].
with unexpected demand or supply intra-day. In so doing we estab-
lish the benchmark for the mechanisms we develop in this paper.
3.3 Allocations and the Balancing Mechanism
In this section we detail two main aspects of traditional electricity
markets. First, we elaborate on how they typically compute the ef-
ﬁcient allocation given the reported day-ahead cost functions and
quantities of all actors in the system. Second, we discuss the bal-
ancing mechanism used to charge agents when they do not conform
to their stated day-ahead consumption and generation proﬁles.
3.3.1 Computing the Efﬁcient Allocation
To compute the maximally efﬁcient allocation, we must assume
that all agents have reported their cost functions and buyers have
also revealed their ﬁxed demand. This extends the model provided
in the AMES testbed in order to compute the optimal allocation of
electricity in the network based on the cost functions speciﬁed by
all the actors in the system. In particular, we add the marginal cost
functions of the transmission lines as another penalty to the objec-
tive function in the AMES model. The model consists of a convex
optimisation problem which describes the goal of efﬁciency max-
imisation subject to modelled physical constraints on the system.
More formally, we maximise
3
X
b2B
qb(cb dbqb) 
X
s2S
qs(xs+ysqs) 
X
t2T
qt(wt+ztq
t
t ); (1)
subject to jqtj  q
max
t for all t 2 T and
X
b2Bn
qb + q
fixed
b  
X
s2Sn
qs +
X
t2Tn
qt = 08n 2 N; (2)
Here, the ﬁrst constraint restricts the quantity that can ﬂow in a line
and constraint (2) ensures that the total amount of power entering a
node is the same as the amount leaving. Since ﬂows are calculated
accordingtovoltageanglesdifferences, asareferencepointwealso
specify that the voltage angle at node n
1 is zero, n1 = 0.
If we set wt = zt = 0 for all t 2 T, then the optimal value of
this is the maximum efﬁciency possible for given buyer and seller
agents’ preferences. All measurements of efﬁciency we use are
given in reference to this maximum. When congestion prices are
non-zero, themarketefﬁciencyoftheoptimalallocationmaybeob-
tained by taking the optimal value of (1) and adding
P
t2T qt(wt+
ztq
t
t ). This optimal allocation efﬁciency acts as the benchmark
against which will we evaluate our market mechanism.
As we stated above, existing studies of the power market that
computes optimal allocations rely on the actors in the system re-
porting their cost functions truthfully a day ahead. While this may
be plausible for the network manager whose main goal is to ensure
securityofsupply, itisunrealisticfortheindividualbuyersandsell-
ers who are simply interested in maximising their proﬁts by either
charging a higher price (for sellers) or requesting a lower price (for
buyers). Moreover, since the market works on a day-ahead basis,
agents may misreport due to the difﬁculty of accurately predicting
their preferences ahead of time. For example, many sources of re-
newable generation (such as wind and solar power) are inherently
variable. We consider how such issues are currently managed.
3.3.2 The Balancing Mechanism
So far, we have considered what happens in an electricity market a
dayaheadofactualconsumption, inwhichagentsmustsubmittheir
required quantities for every half-hourly period of the day. This
means they need to accurately predict their consumption pattern or
3We used IBM ILOG CPLEX to implement and solve the optimi-
sation problem.generation capacity one day-ahead in order to minimise their costs
(i.e., by trading exactly what they need to). If their predictions
are wrong, the agents consume or produce more or less than what
the allocation allowed them to. For example, sudden cold weather
will induce buyers to use up more than they expected (and bought
in the day-ahead market). Usually, if demand is not as expected,
suppliers have to cope by generating more than they were expecting
to in order to keep the system stable.
4 Hence, generators have to be
compensated for their extra production and buyers have to pay for
their extra demand.
The pricing of this extra demand is usually catered for by what is
termed a balancing mechanism. This mechanism usually assumes
the existence of a pool rate (e.g, as in the UK) which dictates the
cheapest cost of generating an extra unit of power at the point when
it was needed (see [11] for more details). This rate is used to charge
extra demand and reward extra supply. However, there are several
issues with existing balancing mechanisms. First, the are usually
run independently of the day-ahead allocation process and ignore
the bids that were submitted in the mechanism a day-ahead. Hence,
the pool rate computed in a balancing mechanism is not the best
price that agents could receive or pay, and this may decrease the
efﬁciency of the system. Second, the pool rate can be easily gamed
by the agents in the system by simply understating their genera-
tion capacity or over stating their demanded levels and therefore
they get compensated for over generation and under consumption
intra-day. Third, and not least, the balancing mechanism is run as
an off-line process that involves signiﬁcant auditing effort that will
simply not scale to the number of transactions envisioned in the
Smart Grid.
Against this background, in the next section we introduce an
electricity market mechanism to remedy the above issues. Our
mechanism does not require agents to be truthful or willing to re-
veal their preferences to a centre. The mechanism also ensures that
the ﬂows in the system are secure (i.e., no lines are overloaded)
and that the balancing mechanism can scale up to large numbers of
agents in real-time.
4. ELECTRICITY MARKET DESIGN
Our market mechanism is composed of three main parts:
1. The Trading Mechanism — this dictates the rules of inter-
actions of the agents trading in the system.
2. The Security Mechanism – this computes the ﬂows gen-
erated in the system by each trade and informs the market
mechanism of the transmission line charges for every trade
in the system.
3. The Online Balancing Mechanism — this uses information
generated within the market mechanism to settle prices for
extra demand and supply intra-day in real-time.
The combination of these three mechanisms deﬁne the complete
context within which we develop new trading agents that can au-
tomate the trading procedure and use advanced trading strategies
(in Section 5) to maximise the proﬁt of each individual buyer or
seller they represent. Moreover, as we show later in Section 6 these
trading strategies also generate a very high level of system-wide
efﬁciency while guaranteeing secure supply and they do not rely
on any regulation to ensure the system efﬁciency is not affected by
4If demand is higher than supply, generators will start to slow down
andthefrequencyofthevoltagewilldroptolowlevelswhichmight
be harmful to generators and devices connected to the grid. The
only way to bring the frequency back up is to increase generation
in the system or cut power to the loads.
agents misreporting their preferences (i.e., this is left to the effect of
open market competition). Moreover, our online balancing mecha-
nism ensures that the agents cannot game the prices given to them
in real-time.
We detail each component of our mechanism in the following
subsections and thoroughly empirically evaluate it in section 6 to
show that it can generate high levels of efﬁciency when the partici-
pating trading agents have both advanced and simple strategies.
4.1 The Trading Mechanism
Here, we describe the protocol of our trading mechanism, i.e. the
rules that deﬁne the exchange process between buyers and sellers
in the market to manage their offers to buy (bids) and sell (asks).
Our approach is based on the use of the CDA which we detail next.
4.1.1 The Continuous Double Auction
The CDA allows multiple buyers and sellers to compete in a market
for homogeneous goods, as opposed to Single-Sided Auctions such
as the English Auction (with a single seller) or the Dutch Auction
(with a single buyer). Speciﬁcally, the CDA lasts a ﬁxed period of
time, known as the trading period (at the end of which the market
closes and no more offers are accepted) and is termed as continuous
because it allows traders to submit offers at any time during a trad-
ing period and the market clears continuously (i.e., whenever a new
transaction is possible between an accepted bid and ask). Traders
are allowed to submit two types of offers, the elastic limit order (to
buy or sell with a price constraint) and the inelastic market order
(to buy or sell an exact quantity at any price or nothing at all). Note
that market orders are usually cleared immediately (given no price
constraints) if there are enough unmatched offers in the orderbook
(where all bids are recorded). Information about the market state is
made public to all market participants through the bid and ask or-
derbooks where the accepted bids and asks are listed, respectively.
The current market price (i.e. the latest transaction price) is also
published in the traditional CDA format.
5
We design our electricity market as a variant of the CDA. Specif-
ically, we provide a trading mechanism
6 to allow the allocation
of electricity between multiple consumers and producers over a
transmission network, subject to the critical constraint of a secure
ﬂow (i.e., the ﬂow through each transmission line, as a result of
power allocation between consumers and generators, is within its
capacity). To this end, in the following subsections we deﬁne the
three key parts of our trading mechanism, namely; (i) the quote-
accepting policy which dictates what offers get accepted or rejected
in the market, (ii) the market clearing procedure which matches the
offers to buy and sell electricity and, (iii) the information revelation
policy which dictates what information gets revealed to the agents
to incentivise competition in the system.
4.1.2 The Quote-Accepting Policy
This policy deﬁnes how we decide which offers to accept or reject
in the market. To elaborate on this policy, we ﬁrst deﬁne the types
of offers that can be submitted in the market and make-up of the
bid and ask orderbooks.
1. Market-order Bid: Typically, buyers have some amount of
ﬁxed demand (e.g., to heat their house in the winter, or light
up streets). To meet this, buyer b can submit an inelastic
market-order bid, bid
M
b = bid(b;qb;nb) to buy exactly qb
5There exist many variants of the CDA, based on different market
protocols — see [7] for more details.
6As with the traditional CDA, buyers and sellers are allowed to
submit bids and asks at any time during a trading period.units of power at any price at any time during a trading pe-
riod.
2. Limit-order Bid: Buyers can also have price sensitive de-
mand (e.g., turning on their washing machine, or charging
their home storage device). Thus, buyer b, located at node nb
cansubmitanelasticlimit-orderbid, bid
L
b = bid(b;qb;pb;nb)
to buy up to qb units of power at a maximum unit price of pb
at any time during a trading period.
3. Limit-order Ask: Seller s located at node ns can submit an
elastic ask, ask
L
b = ask(s;qs;ps;ns) to sell up to qj units
of power at a minimum unit price of pb at any time during
a trading period. In general, sellers could also have market-
orders (as buyers above) but in the electricity domain, gener-
ators do not sell ﬁxed amounts of electricity at any price.
4. Bid orderbook: Unmatched bids are queued in a bid order-
book orderbookbid, ordered by ﬁrst decreasing bid prices
such that the higher and, thus, more desirable offers (from
a seller’s perspective) are at the top of the orderbook and,
second, by earliest arrival times.
5. Ask orderbook: Unmatched asks are queued in an ask or-
derbookorderbookask, orderedbyincreasingaskpricessuch
thatthelowerand, thus, moredesirableoffers(fromabuyer’s
perspective) are at the top of the orderbook and, second, by
earliest arrival times.
Electricity Market
Market Price: 36.50, Volume=501.49
Buy Orders Sell Orders
Buyer qb pb nb Seller qs ps ns
b8 1.9 36.9 n8 s7 5.350 36.44 n7
b9 0.849 36.62 n9 s4 2.350 36.76 n4
b2 7.2 12.98 n2 s6 9.0 37.44 n6
s1 8.05 38.04 n1
s9 7.1 38.33 n9
Table 1: Bid and Ask orderbooks.
Against this background, we adopt the NYSE quote-accepting
policy which dictates that only bids and asks that improve on them-
selves are accepted in the market. That is, a buyer cannot decrease
the bid price of any of its accepted bids and, conversely, a seller
cannot increase the ask price of any of its accepted asks. This ef-
fectively speeds up the allocation process. Note that because mar-
ket orders are not constrained by price, they are usually immedi-
ately accepted and matched, unless there are insufﬁcient quantities
to match such an order. In such a case, they are usually placed at
the top of the orderbooks, with unmatched market orders sorted by
earliest arrival times.
4.1.3 The Market Clearing Procedure
The market clears continuously. Now, by deﬁnition, orderbooks
contain the unmatched offers in the market. Whenever the state
of the orderbooks changes (i.e., with a new offer or an offer be-
ing improved on), the market attempts to clear by ﬁnding the best
match(bidb;asks;qsecure) (i.e. a buyer b and a seller s are will-
ing to transact qsecure units of power) in the orderbooks (based
on algorithm 4.1.3) by iterating down the orderbooks and trying
to match each bid with each ask until the bid price is less than
the ask price and no match is possible. When the best match is
found, the market clears the matched bid and ask and a transaction
occurs between the successful buyer and seller. Before doing so
however, the mechanism needs to check that the ﬂow is secure and
hence obtain the cost of transmitting qsecure in the network. How
this is achieved is discussed in the security mechanism in section
4.2. For now, we will assume that for a trade between agents b
and s, the security mechanism returns cost
b;s
qsecure as the transmis-
sion line cost for the transaction (if qsecure overloads any line the
cost
b;s
qsecure = 1).
Algorithm 1 The Clearing Algorithm
Require: orderbookbid;orderbookask
1: for all bidb 2 orderbookbid do
2: for all asks : orderbookask do
3: matchi;j   match(bidb;asks;qsecure)
4: end for
5: ask

s   argminasks2orderbookask
 
ps + cost
b;s
qsecure

6: subject to: qsecure > 0
7: clear bidb and ask

s for qsecureunits at a price deﬁned by
our market pricing.
8: end for
Thus, the market prices a transaction between a matched bid bidb
and a matched ask asks using the traditional -pricing method.
Speciﬁcally, a buyer pays bidb   
 
bidb   asks   cost
b;s
qsecure

,
where  2 (0;1), a seller is paid asks + (1   )(bidb   asks 
cost
b;s
qsecure

, where  2 (0;1) and cost
b;s
qsecure is distributed by
the security mechanism among the transmission lines as payment
proportional to their additional ﬂow (see section 4.2 for more de-
tails). Note that because a transaction can result in counterﬂow in a
transmission line, it can happen that cost
b;s
qsecure is negative. While
at the end of the trading period, the cumulative payments to trans-
mission lines will equal their charging rates, during the trading pe-
riod, trades that result in counterﬂow (as explained in section 3.2)
can be more proﬁtable for traders as transmission costs will be less
or even negative (i.e. being paid to use the transmission network).
Thus, the mechanism effectively incentivises traders to decongest
the network.
4.1.4 The Information Revelation Policy
As discussed earlier, the orderbooks are usually either completely
or partially public (i.e., a certain depth of the orderbook is visi-
ble). In our mechanism, to favour a decentralised approach, the
orderbooks, and all transaction prices, are made completely public.
Now, the outstanding bid and ask (i.e., the best and highest bid and
the best and lowest ask) are usually key information that can be ex-
tracted from the market. The outstanding bid represents the price a
seller should accept to transact and, conversely, the outstanding ask
represents the price a buyer should offer to transact. In our electric-
ity market, these prices no longer hold as matches between bids and
asks are subject to secure ﬂow over the network (i.e., include trans-
mission line costs). This prevents buyers and sellers from making
informed decisions about what to bid next in the market. Hence, it
is important to give indications to buyers and sellers about the types
of transactions they might make with other agents at the same or
other nodes in the network based on transmission constraints. To
this end, we extend the notion of LMPs (see section 2) to provide
an indication of the prices at each node.
We deﬁne two terms to replace the outstanding bids and asks,
namely a Dynamic Locational Marginal Price (DLMP) for buyers,
DLMP
B
nb at node nb and DLMP
S
ns, which are the minimum and
the maximum price a buyer b and seller s at nodes nb and ns would
need to accept to trade respectively. These DLMPs include trans-
mission costs. The DLMP’s are computed as follows:
1. DLMP
B
n is calculated as the lowest cost of buying +1 unit
ofpowerfromtheunmatchedsellersandthecostoftransmis-sion of an additional unit (from the security mechanism —
see section 4.2). As with our matching in our market clear-
ing, we ﬁrst ﬁnd the cheapest secure matches, by iterating
through the unmatched asks in the ask orderbook, that can
sell +1 unit of power. Our DLMP
B
n is the sum of the cheap-
estmatches (thatcansupply exactly+1unit ofpower)at each
node n. However, if qsecure  1, we set the DLMP
B
n as
inﬁnite as the buyer could never acquire at least +1 unit how-
ever high it bids.
2. DLMP
S
n is calculated as the highest price of selling +1
unit of power to the unmatched buyers at node n and the
transmission cost for the additional unit (from the security
mechanism — see section 4.2). As with our matching in our
market clearing, we ﬁrst ﬁnd the highest secure matches, by
iterating through the unmatched bids in the bid orderbook,
that can buy +1 unit of power. Our DLMP
S
n is the sum
of these highest matches (that can buy exactly +1 unit of
power). However, if qsecure <= 1, we set the DLMP
S
n as
0 as the seller could never sell at least +1 unit even at price 0.
The market individually publishes the DLMP
B
n to all buyers
and DLMP
S
n to all sellers within node n 8n 2 N. In the next
section, we show how to compute the cost of transmission using
congestion pricing principles and DC ﬂow approximation of the
ﬂows in the network.
4.2 The Security Mechanism
Here we show how to determine whether a match between a bid
and an ask can occur and what transmission cost to charge to the
transaction. Thus, given bid(b;qb;pb;nb) and ask(s;qs;ps;ns)),
we need to determine a quantity qsecure in the range qsecure 2
[0;min(qb;qs)] (since the seller can never buy or sell more than
they offer or demand) that the network can handle between them.
In the next section we ﬁrst compute qsecure based on capacity con-
straints and given transmission line charges. Then we show how
to create such charges and how they help to maximise efﬁciency in
the system.
4.2.1 Making Secure Transactions
Given the current state of the network where some trades have hap-
pened, for every line t 2 T we compute the quantity qt that ﬂows
in each transmission line using the DC power ﬂow model. Now, the
DC power ﬂow equations state that for each line t 2 T, the ﬂow is
given by qt = (n   n0)=rt (see section 3.2) where n and n0
are the voltage angles at its end nodes n;n
0. Given values for the
amount of net load or generation at each node n 2 N, if the net
power transfer is zero, or if the value for one node is left as an un-
known, then the DC power ﬂow equations have a unique solution.
Furthermore, as it is linear, the map which takes the vector of net
power ﬂow at each node to the set of net power ﬂows through each
transmission line may be expressed as a matrix. To calculate the
net power ﬂow at a node n 2 N it is only required to sum qb   qs
for all b 2 Bn and s 2 Sn. Thus, to calculate the effect of a trade
of amount q between buyer b and seller s, it is only necessary to
multiply the given matrix and a vector with q in the entry for the
node where b is located and  q in the entry for the node where
s is located, and zeros elsewhere. Since the given matrix may be
pre-calculated from knowledge of the network topology and trans-
mission line properties, this calculation can be very fast.
Having obtained qt for every t in the network, we can compute
the net effect of the transaction of qb = min(qi;qj) and qs =
 min(qb;qs) at nodes ni and nj respectively. To this end we
compute the effect of qb = 1 and qs =  1 on every line and let t
be the resulting ﬂow of power in t. Then we can comptute, for all
lines: q
 = argmaxq0
R q0
0 tdqt

subject to: q

t  q
max
t for all
t 2 T. If the q

t exists (i.e., the constraint is satisﬁed for all lines in
the network), qsecure = q
. Then, given the new ﬂows q
0
t for every
t, generated in the system using the same procedure as above, we
can compute the overall marginal cost for one unit of power in the
transaction between b and s as:
cost
b;s
qsecure = cost
b;s(min(qb;qs))
=
P
t2T(q
0
t   qt)  costt(qt)
min(qb;qs)
where costt(q) is the integral of pt = wt + zt(t   1)jqtj
t with
respect to q. If lines will be overloaded by any q, then the bid and
ask cannot be matched as the cost of the transaction is inﬁnite.
4.2.2 Transmission Line Pricing
When there is no congestion pricing, that is wt = zt = 0 for all
t 2 T, then the optimal allocation gives the best possible market
efﬁciency given the buyer and seller agents’ preferences. However,
in that case the CDA is unlikely to perform well, because many
different traders are competing for limited resources. Congestion
pricing, as detailed above, can improve efﬁciency by pricing lower
proﬁt transactions out of the market, thus prioritising more prof-
itable transactions. From convex optimisation theory [2] we know
that if wt is chosen correctly for all t 2 T, then the optimal al-
location is the not only the same whether or not capacity con-
straints are followed, but it also coincides with the optimal allo-
cation when there is no congestion pricing. Since CDAs are typi-
cally very efﬁcient for unconstrained markets, we would expect our
market mechanism to perform very well under such circumstances.
In order to ﬁnd optimal congestion pricing, we adapt the trans-
mission line fees over multiple iterations of the market. Each line
independently adjusts its pricing in a decentralised way with the
intention of charging more if it is congested and less if it is uncon-
gested. Speciﬁcally, we have a constant  = 0:95 such that at the
end of a market iteration, for each t 2 T, if jqtj > q
max
t then wt
is increased by 5% and if jqtj < q
max
t then wt is decreased by
5%. The motivation for this approach is that, if the CDA can get
close to optimal allocation at each iteration, this process is similar
to a steepest descent method for solving the dual problem to market
efﬁciency maximisation [2].
Having deﬁned how transactions would be managed in the day-
ahead market, we now examine the more dynamic intra-day trans-
actions and specify a novel online balancing mechanism.
4.3 The Online Balancing Mechanism
Attheendoftheday-aheadtradingperiod, nomoretransactionsare
possible, with the orderbooks showing the unmatched bids and asks
from buyers and sellers still willing to trade during the real-time
transmission. Because demand and supply cannot be accurately
predicted, demand and supply need to be balanced in real-time for
stability (see Subsection 3.3).
During the balancing stage, the market is responsible for balanc-
ing the unpredicted demand and supply with respect to the market-
allocated ones. It does so in the following way:
1. +demandi isadditionalpowerrequiredbyabuyerbi. Be-
cause it is already being drawn from the network, it needs to
be settled as an inelastic bid, i.e. a market-order bid submit-
ted in the bid orderbook.
2.  demandi is extra power demanded by a buyer bi. To
cover the short position,
7 the buyer needs to increase the
7Covering a position means buying or selling power such that themarket demand with a market-order to sell demandi re-
gardless of price.
3.  supplyj isextrapowerthatsellersj couldnotsupply. To
cover the short position, the buyer needs to increase the mar-
ketsupplybysubmittingamarket-orderbidtobuysupplyj.
These market-order bids and asks are placed at the top of the
bid and ask orderbooks respectively (because these traders have to
buy and sell at any price). The market then clears these orders
with matches only based on secure quantities (as in our clearing
algorithm) and not price. +demandi and  supplyj are then
priced at DLMP
B while  demandi is priced at DLMP
S that
represent the best prices (in real-time) in the market.
Now, DLMP
S  obid < oask  DLMP
B (where obid and
oask are outstanding bids and ask respectively). At the end of the
trading period, because the intra-marginal (i.e. the cheaper) sellers
have been allocated, the extra-marginal (i.e. the more expensive)
ones are left such that DLMP
B is now very high. Similarly, be-
causetheintra-marginal(i.e. thericher)buyershavebeenallocated,
leaving the poorer ones unallocated, DLMP
S is very low.
Errors in demand and supply quantities result in the buyer hav-
ing to buy +demandi at much higher prices and covering for
 demandi at very low prices, making losses in both cases. Sim-
ilarly, the seller needs to cover  supplyj at higher prices than he
was paid for supplying supplyj and, thus, making a loss. This
clearly shows it is in the best interests of the agents to truthfully
reveal and accurately predict their demand or generation capacity a
day ahead. We omit a more formal proof due to lack of space.
5. THE TRADING AGENTS
Given the market protocols, trading agents have to strategise in the
market based on their private preferences. Now, because their pref-
erences are deﬁned as continuous functions (see Section 3), we dis-
cretise the traders’ preferences as piecewise constant incremental
cost curves [13] to form a set of endowments (pairs of quantity q
and limit price `). Given their endowments, we will describe, in the
next subsection, how a buyer and a seller strategise in the market
by forming a bid based on its limit price `
B
i and an ask based on its
limit price of `
S
j respectively using trading strategies base on the
AA and ZI strategies.
5.1 The ZI Strategy
We ﬁrst consider the Zero-Intelligence strategy. As developed by
Gode and Sunder [10], the ZI strategy randomises over the whole
space of offers allowed in the system, with a bid price pi drawn
from a uniform distribution between 0 and the limit price `
B
i and
the ask price from a uniform distribution between the limit price
`
S
j and some arbitrarily high price that would always be accepted
in the market. Because it makes random and uninformed decisions
(by ignoring all market information), ZI is rationally the baseline
strategy, providing a lower bound on the efﬁciency of the system.
5.2 The AA-EM Strategy
We next consider the more efﬁcient AA strategy [19]. Due to prop-
erties of our market mechanism a single market equilibrium price
[16] at which the market can optimally clear no longer exists. In
particular, different nodes have different DLMPs and the best
buyers may not trade with the best sellers because of the power
ﬂow constraints. As a consequence of this, the AA strategy, which
is based on the micro-economic theory of transaction prices con-
vergence to an equilibrium, is not appropriate for our system. To
market demand equals supply. E.g. a buyer who overbids for q +
q and draws only q needs to sell q.
this end, we develop a novel variant of the AA (called AA-EM) that
is tailored to Electricity Markets.
Speciﬁcally, we make a number of fundamental changes.
8 Be-
cause the outstanding bid and ask are no longer valid (see Sub-
section 4.1.4), the AA-EM trader instead considers DLMPs as a
target of what it requires to transact. Furthermore, because there is
no equilibrium, transaction prices are no longer a good indication
for the ‘equilibrium price’ (which represents the expected transac-
tion price in a standard CDA). Instead, transaction prices within the
same node (and, hence, subject to the same power ﬂow constraints)
are a better measure for equilibrium price. Thus, we use a weighted
average of transaction prices (with signiﬁcantly more weight given
to transactions within the same node) to calculate that equilibrium
price in our variant of the AA. Finally, because a buyer might have
the outstanding bid which is higher than the outstanding ask (that
typically result in a transaction in a standard CDA) and still not
transact because of power ﬂow constraints, the AA-EM has an ad-
ditional bidding rule. In more detail, if a buyer or seller has the
outstanding bid or ask (i.e. it is at the top of the orderbook), it sets
its target as the DLMP
B and DLMP
S respectively.
6. EMPIRICAL EVALUATION
In this section, we empirically evaluate our trading mechanism us-
ing the ZI and AA-EM strategies for a number of conﬁgurations
for the electricity network. Speciﬁcally, we draw the parameters
a;b;c;d for buyers and sellers from uniform distribution and cre-
ate a random network (with a square lattice) with 16 nodes, with a
buyer and a seller at each node.
In our ﬁrst set of experiments, we consider the performance of
our mechanism with different capacity constraints in the system,
by varying the average capacity constraint of each transmission
line. Our results in Figure 1 show that the structure of our mech-
anism is fairly efﬁciency, with a lower bound efﬁciency ranging
from 88% to 96% of the optimal (when considering the baseline
Zero-Intelligence Strategy). Now, when we employ the more in-
telligent AA-EM strategy, our system efﬁciency (the total proﬁts
of all traders) increases, varying then from 92% to 99% of the op-
timal. As expected of the system, the efﬁciency drops as capac-
ity decreases, reaching a point, with a capacity tending towards 0,
where only buyers and sellers within the same node can trade with
each other. Our mechanism indeed degrades well in such a situ-
ation, with our mechanism ensuring system security at all times.
Furthermore, we empirically demonstrate that the efﬁciency of the
optimal allocation is reduced if it is calculated from misreported
agent preferences (as predicted in Section 1). In particular Fig-
ure 1 shows how the optimal allocation is worse than AA (and ZI
in less congested networks) when malicious traders start shading
their bids by up to 10%.
Next, weevaluateourmechanismwithindifferentstandardgraph
topologies that exist in an electricity network (e.g., fully connected,
a ring, a sparse and a small-world network). As expected, from
Figure 2, we can see that AA-EM outperforms ZI in these different
topologies, with efﬁciencies of above 90% of the optimal. One in-
teresting observation is that the structure of mechanism tends to be
less efﬁcient in ring and sparse topologies. This is to be expected,
as the lack of interconnectivity inhibits non-local trading and thus
reduces competition within the market. In such cases, the gap be-
tween ZI and AA-EM performance is greatest and the beneﬁt of
market intelligence though better strategies is accentuated.
8Because of space constraints, we omit the speciﬁc rules of the
AA-EM though they can easily be recreated from its description.Figure 1: System Efﬁciency against average capacity of trans-
mission lines. The optimal is calculated according to Equation
1. Malicious traders shade their bids or asks by up to 10%.
Figure 2: System Efﬁciency given different topologies (namely
a fully connected, a ring, a sparse and a small-world network).
Finally, in our last set of experiments, we validate the learn-
ing mechanism of the transmission lines. From Figure 3, the sys-
tem efﬁciency, on average, increases slowly over the trading days.
As expected from the manner transmission lines adapt the charges
(see Subsection 3.2), the congested lines will gradually increase the
charges while the non-congested ones will decrease their charges.
Because of these new charges, the richer buyers and cheaper sell-
ers are more likely to trade and generate more surplus, which then
increases the efﬁciency of the system.
7. CONCLUSIONS
We have proposed a novel electricity market which operates in a
non-cooperative setting and strictly avoids overloading transmis-
sion lines. Furthermore, we have provided a novel online balanc-
ing mechanism that is tightly coupled to our market mechanism
that ensures agents cannot game the day-ahead market in order to
make proﬁts in the intra-day transactions. We have demonstrated
the high level of efﬁciency this system achieves in a variety of sim-
ulated environments and provided novel trading strategies that can
generate up to 99% efﬁciency in the market and establish a lower
bound of 86% when simple behaviours are used in the system.
Our market mechanism contains novel components which ad-
vance the state of the art in electricity market design. We have also
developed effective automated trading strategies, which could be
adopted by users of the Smart Grid to maximise their beneﬁts. Fur-
Figure 3: System Efﬁciency with transmission lines learning.
thermore, we have explored ways for future network operators to
manage congestion, protect against transmission line overloads and
plan for further infrastructure improvements.
Further open research questions that remain are how the mech-
anism’s stability and performance are affected by random effects
and changes in the market, how to further expand the scalability
and functionality of the system and whether transmission losses or
measurement error can have a signiﬁcant negative impact on efﬁ-
ciency. In the future, we also intend to develop a real-time simu-
lation of the electricity market and empirically evaluate losses of
traders trying to game the system or with poor prediction of their
demand and supply.
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